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ABSTRACT
Online prediction markets are a powerful tool for aggregating information and 
show promise as predictive tools for uncertain outcomes, from sporting events 
to election results. However, these markets only serve as effective prediction 
tools so long as the market pricing remains efficient. We analyze the potential 
arbitrage profits derived from such mispricings in two leading American 
political prediction markets, PredictIt (for the 2016 and 2020 elections) and the 
Iowa Electronic Markets (for the 2016 election), to quantify the degree of 
mispricing and to show how market design can contribute to price distortion. 
We show that contracts hosted by PredictIt, compared to the IEM, are 
chronically mispriced, with large arbitrage profits in the 2016 election markets 
and tangible profits for the 2020 markets. We discuss the role of profit fees and 
contract limits, the primary differences between the PredictIt and IEM, in 
distorting pricing on PredictIt by limiting the ability of traders to capture 
arbitrage profits. Additionally, we examine the association between arbitrage 
and margin-linking, increased liquidity, and the number of unique contracts in 
PredictIt’s markets. This research provides cautionary evidence of potential 
inefficiencies in prediction markets with the intention of improving market 
implementation and enhancing market predictiveness.
1 INTRODUCTION
Political uncertainty can have an enormous impact on business and investment 
decisions globally (Julio and Yook, 2016; Kelly et al., 2016). Election 
uncertainty, in particular, is something researchers have tried to overcome for 
decades through developing a series of methods for forecasting election 
outcomes. While one method of eliminating such uncertainty is to aggregate 
the opinions of the electorate via election polls, an alternative and relatively 
new method is to utilize the price system of the market, i.e., asking people to 
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“put their money where their mouth is” through participation in political 
prediction markets (Servan-Schreiber et al., 2004; Graefe, 2017).
Prediction markets are exchanges in which participants buy and sell 
contracts that typically correspond to binary states at a certain time in the 
future. Accordingly, these contracts resolve to a specified payout value if the 
contract state is true at the settlement date or expire worthless if it is false. 
The prediction market serves to predict the event’s outcome, much in the way 
that a futures contract reflects the expectation of the underlying asset’s value at 
a future time (Ederington, 1979). These markets operate similarly to stock 
exchanges and other financial markets wherein traders have a profit incentive to 
seek the truth about the contract’s underlying event. For example, if a trader has 
found evidence that Event A will occur, he or she may buy shares of the Event A 
contract in a prediction market. With enough trading volume, the price moves 
upward. Accordingly, one can interpret the price of the contract as the market’s 
aggregate estimate of the probability of that event’s occurrence. 
The concept of market pricing representing the aggregation of information 
was discussed by Hayek (1945). He noted that a market with many participants 
contributing partial information performs the same function that an omniscient 
price-setter would. In this way, the market functions not only as a setting for 
commodity exchange, but as an effective means to aggregate information. 
Participants may trade the contract either as speculators, who expect to profit from 
the realization of their prediction; or hedgers, who trade to mitigate risk outside the 
market; or as arbitrageurs, who seek to profit from market mispricings.
Interest in prediction markets has grown exponentially since the 1990s as 
these markets offer promising mechanisms for aggregating information 
dispersed among several market agents (Tziralis and Tatsiopoulos, 2012). 
Manski (2006) concluded that market prices in prediction markets reflect the 
aggregation of market participants’ beliefs, risk tolerance, and available funds. 
Ray (2006) listed the conditions required for prediction markets to be predictive, 
to represent the “wisdom of crowds”: a diversity of opinions, the ability to bet 
independently of others, and the ability to act on specialized information 
without influencing the event in question. Most importantly, prediction markets 
have been shown to predict actual election outcomes with a remarkable degree 
of accuracy, outperforming polls (Forsythe et al., 1992; Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 
2004, 2006; Berg et al., 2008a,b; Majumder et al., 2009; Graefe, 2017).
Nonetheless, most recently, prediction markets have garnered renewed 
attention due to their “failures” in predicting the results of the Brexit referendum 
and the 2016 U.S. presidential election. As there is evidence of rational players 
in other markets anticipating these results better than prediction markets could 
(Blau et al. 2019), it is necessary to ensure that prediction markets are indeed as 
sound as we believe them to be. Examining successes and pitfalls of prediction 
markets has become increasingly important, especially given the growing use of 
social media, the strong positive association between social media use and political 
misinformation (Valenzuela et al., 2019), and emerging social media platforms 
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that either host prediction markets or mimic their aggregation mechanism. 
(Ritterman et al., 2009; Schoen et al., 2013; Lewandowsky et al., 2017). 
It is necessary to fine-tune our understanding of prediction market mechanisms 
in order to avoid prediction failures in existing markets and to inform the 
market design and implementation of emerging market platforms.
Although prediction markets appear to offer a promising mechanism for 
aggregating information and beliefs, and could prove even more fruitful in the 
recent age of misinformation than was imagined at their outset, there is a notable 
gap in studies examining efficiency in these markets outside the context of 
financial prediction markets (Kildal et al., 2012; Croxson and Reade, 2013). 
Efficiency studies are especially rare for election forecasting markets even 
though these markets are considered some of the more successful types of 
prediction markets (Kildal et al., 2012, Graefe, 2017). Regulatory constraints 
imposed on prediction markets in the United States lead to fewer such markets 
in operation than may be optimal or desired (Arrow et al, 2008). Among other 
factors, a lack of sufficient competition among prediction markets can naturally 
result in inefficiencies, which could greatly diminish the accuracy, the predictive 
power, and thereby the promise they offer. Thus, it is crucial to assess the 
efficiency of political prediction markets, especially given their growing 
popularity and the information landscape changing so significantly and rapidly.
Table 1 provides a limited summary of the literature on sports betting and 
election market efficiency. Most of the prediction market efficiency literature 
has focused on sport betting markets rather than on election markets. As 
efficiency across market domains can differ (Tetlock, 2004), additional research 
on election market efficiency would be advantageous. Among efficiency 
studies of election markets, much of the evidential support comes from the 
Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM), which have been shown to be fairly efficient 
despite irrational traders and/or behavior (Forsythe et al., 1999; Oliven and 
Rietz, 2004), yet other election markets have undergone much less scrutiny.1 
This limited set of literature has not amassed enough studies nor sufficient 
consensus on all aspects of efficiency. Rather, prediction market studies have 
focused on different types of market efficiency. Several studies have examined 
the impact of information releases on price efficiency, and have found mixed 
evidence regarding the effect of new information on price efficiency, as well as 
regarding response time for prices to adjust to new information.
An important form of (and the weakest condition for) market efficiency 
(Rhode and Strumpf, 2004; Rothschild and Pennock, 2014), arbitrage, has been 
underexplored (Luckner and Weinhardt, 2008; Kildalet al., 2012). In markets 
where arbitrage opportunities cannot be exploited, the interpretation of prices as 
probability measures can become problematic (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004; 
1 Even outside the context of efficiency studies, IEM studies make up 43% of the 
applied election market literature, and all other international and domestic political 
markets combined make up the remaining 57% (Tziralis and Tatsiopoulos, 2012).
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Table 1. Limited summary of the literature analyzing efficiency of sports betting 
markets and election forecasting markets.




1999 Systematic biases 
and mistakes of 
traders (including 
arbitrage violations)
Arbitrage opportunities and 
wish fulfillment biases are 
reproduced in laboratory 
experiments, consistent with 
those observed in election 
markets. However, unlike 
arbitrage in field 
experiments, arbitrage in lab 
experiments is larger, more 
persistent, and causes prices 
to be greatly inaccurate. 
Overall, such arbitrage has 
little or no effect on market 
efficiency.













The market was fairly 
efficient on all of these 
fronts. Arbitrage was rare 
and short-lived.
Election betting 




2004 Individual rationality 
and arbitrage by two 
types of traders: 
“market makers” and 
“price takers”
Markets appear efficient, 
despite a high frequency of 
apparently irrational 
trader behavior (including 
arbitrage), owing to the 
relatively less mistake- 















arbitrage and betting 
biases
There exist limited but 
highly profitable arbitrage 
opportunities, as well as the 
favorite-longshot bias (FLB) 





and William Hill 
(2002–2004)
Kildal et al. 
(2012)
2012 Arbitrage across 
borders and markets
Arbitrage opportunities are 
rare and difficult to exploit, 
but some such opportunities 





Page (2012) 2012 Favorite-longshot 
bias (FLB)






2013 Price efficiency 
response time to 
news information.
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and other forms of 
bounded irrationality.
Markets appear generally 
efficient despite the 
existence of the inefficiencies 
studied. Changes in 
prediction market design can 
minimize these efficiencies.






2016 Price efficiency 
response time to 
tweets
Mostly efficient. Slow response 
of tweets, but quick response 
to more credible news
Betfair (2010)
Brown et al. 
(2019)
2019 Price efficiency 
post-poll information 
release 
Price efficiency declines 
temporarily post a poll-
release owing to attracting 
relatively inexperienced 
traders, and recovers when 
more experienced traders 
enter some hours later. Thus, 






2019 Longshot bias and 
the overconfidence 
bias.
Markets appear efficient at 
short horizons, but non-







2019 Responses of a 
political prediction 
market and of a 
currency market to 
the EU referendum 
results 
announcement.
Both markets appeared 
inefficient, and the political 
market seemed less 













Markets exhibit FLB, and the 
level of FLB decreases with 
duration of the market.
PredictIt 
(2014–2016)
Sethi, 2015a, 2016; Berg and Rietz, 2019). In particular, markets that impose 
transaction costs and/or profit fees can lead to mispricing (Berg and Rietz, 2019). 
Note that the generally popularized notion that prediction markets are efficient 
stems primarily from the efficiency of the IEM. However, the IEM has key 
features, such as account limits for avoiding any one trader to become too large, 
no trading fees, and a simple arbitrage structure, which allow the market to 
operate efficiently in spite of irrational trader behavior (Berg and Rietz, 2019). 
That there exist arbitrageurs in other prediction markets as well appears untested 
Table 1. (continued)
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in the recent literature. Only a handful of prediction market studies have 
examined arbitrage, many of which have focused on inter-market arbitrage rather 
than intra-market arbitrage, and such arbitrage studies appear to have declined 
over time. This decline in studies of arbitrage is unsurprising given that apart 
from a few warning signals, early studies found few opportunities of arbitrage, 
which were typically short-lived, and markets appeared to perform efficiently 
despite arbitrage violations (Forsythe et al., 1999; Oliven and Rietz, 2004). 
However, as there is insufficient evidence of large and persistent arbitrage 
opportunities, it is unclear if prediction markets, generally (and not just the IEM), 
would also perform well under larger and more persistent arbitrage opportunities. 
Thus, it is important to take an updated look at election market efficiency, and 
arbitrage is an important and natural starting point for studying market efficiency 
(Vlastakis, 2009). Studying intra-market arbitrage can be particularly 
advantageous as it eliminates currency risk issues and fee- and contract-structure 
differences that can obfuscate analyses of inter-market arbitrage. Additionally, as 
a potential intra-market arbitrageur would only need to follow one market rather 
than two, opportunities should be easier to detect and utilize, making intra-
market arbitrage less frequent in efficient markets (Kildal et al., 2009).
This paper focuses on identifying arbitrage opportunities in PredictIt, a 
market that is similar to the well-functioning IEM, yet has some key market 
design differences. PredictIt is a relatively new and understudied market that 
has nonetheless gained significant popularity in recent years. We hypothesize 
that due to key market design differences between IEM and PredictIt, especially 
with respect to fee structure and contract limits, PredictIt will exhibit signs of 
inefficiency, such as unexploited arbitrage opportunities, that are atypical of a 
well-functioning market such as the IEM. Additionally, we test the association 
between arbitrage and margin-linking introduced in 2015, increased liquidity, 
and the number of unique contracts.
Using recent PredictIt data from the 2016 and the upcoming 2020 U.S. 
presidential elections and IEM data from the U.S. 2016 election, this paper shows 
large and persistent mispricings in PredictIt. The findings from PredictIt are 
compared to those from IEM. Market design differences, such as profit fees and 
contract limits, that could contribute to the mispricings and arbitrage 
opportunities observed on PredictIt are then discussed. PredictIt and IEM have 
been compared briefly in blog posts (Sethi, 2015a,b, 2016), and PredictIt 
price inefficiency has been briefly mentioned by a recent working paper (Schmitz 
and Rothschild, 2019) which uses PredictIt data from one U.S. state to test trader 
efficiency. Nevertheless, there is no formal or in-depth study focusing on 
PredictIt’s mispricings and arbitrage opportunities. This paper contributes to the 
emerging work analyzing this relatively understudied yet increasingly important 
market and to the sparse literature on political prediction market efficiency with 
the intention of improving the functioning of political prediction markets.
This paper is organized as follows: Sec. 2 describes and compares the 
market structure of PredictIt and IEM. Sec. 3 presents the conceptual 
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framework used for identifying arbitrage opportunities in political prediction 
markets, with a focus on PredictIt. Sec. 4 presents the analysis and the key 
findings, with discussion of market design aspects and trader experience that 
play a role in market mispricings. Finally, a brief summary and concluding 
remarks are given in Sec. 5.
2 PREDICTIT AND IEM
The study focuses on the PredictIt market and compares it to the IEM, as 
these are both considered comparable markets, yet have some key market 
design differences that allow for understanding the impact of market design 
features on the functioning of these markets. While IEM hosts markets in 
both winner-take-all and vote-share formats, we focus on the winner-take-all 
markets as they provide the greatest parallel to PredictIt’s offerings. A 
systematic comparison of PredictIt and IEM using the key market design 
criteria proposed in Spann and Skiera (2003) is presented in Table 2.
The PredictIt market (Victoria University of Wellington, 2015a) is operated 
by the Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. Since 2014, it has 
strongly focused its markets on national elections in the United States and has 
later expanded to predict many other consequential political events both in the 
U.S. and worldwide. As a research tool, PredictIt operates with a letter of 
no-action from the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) that 
removes the risk of government prosecution (Victoria University of Wellington, 
2015a; U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 2014). PredictIt is open 
for U.S.-dollar trading to U.S. residents from 48 states as well as non-U.S. 
residents (Victoria University of Wellington, 2015a). To maintain an academic 
setting, PredictIt limits each contract to only 5,000 unique traders at one time, 
with each trading position limited to $850 in value (Victoria University of 
Wellington, 2015a; U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 2014). IEM 
similarly acts with CFTC permission and contract position limits.
Secondly, PredictIt and IEM are both academic markets. Due to the legal 
particularity that marks prediction markets in the U.S., academic markets have 
been historically more successful than non-academic markets (Arrow et al., 
2008). Generally, the U.S. government considers buying and selling shares in 
an unregulated market using U.S. dollars to be unlawful gambling, or if the 
contracts represent financial events, an unregulated financial market (Brito 
et al., 2014). Consequently, the most successful markets have operated with 
governmental permission as part of academic studies, as these two markets 
have. Outside of the academic context, political prediction markets have been 
less successful. As there are few prediction markets due to the regulatory 
constraints, and as academic ones are most likely to succeed, PredictIt and 
IEM are important to study and compare.
As can be seen in Table 2, IEM and PredictIt are similar across key design 
features. Compared to PredictIt, IEM hosts markets of relatively shorter 
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durations, and uses closed order book (vs. open order book), i.e., lists only the 
best bids/asks (vs. all bids/asks). We focus the discussion in this paper on two 
key differences between the IEM and PredictIt: profit fees and contract limit 
constraints on arbitrage trading. Additionally, we examine the relationship 
between margin-linking introduced in 2015, increased liquidity, and the 
number of unique contracts on the functioning of PredictIt, factors that are 
considered important for the performance of prediction markets.
Table 2. Comparison of IEM and PredictIt markets using the framework in 
Spann and Skiera (2003).







Selection of the 
prediction issue 
Issues chosen by the 
IEM Board of Directors
Issues chosen by 
Victoria University of 
Wellington, New 
Zealand.
Formulation for the 
payoff function 
Vote Share 
(proportional payoff) & 
Winner Take All 
(Boolean)
Boolean: $1/share if 
win; $0 if loss
Duration of the virtual 
stock market
Depends: most of a 
year (2016), Over one 
year (2020: 2/7/19– 
11/3/20)
Depends: typically two 
years + (2016, 2020 
markets)
Open to the public or 
limited participation 
(specific groups or 
time periods) 
Open to the public 
(24/7); US & non-US 
traders
Open to the public 
(24/7); US & non-US 
traders; Maximum 






Composition of initial 
portfolios/endowment 
None provided None provided
Investment of real 
money or endowment




per share of correct 
prediction
Traders remunerated 







and reward versus 
Linear / Zero-Sum Linear / Zero-Sum
— If zero-sum game: 
“unit portfolios” or 
“jackpot” 
Unit portfolios Unit portfolios
Financial market 
design
Trading mechanism:   
— Market maker (i.e., 
dealer) 
No No
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3  FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS AND GENERAL 
FRAMEWORK
3.1 ARBITRAGE AND MARKET MISPRICINGS
As previously described, the purpose of a prediction market is for traders to 
aggregate information and reach a common market price that reflects the 
likelihood of the underlying event’s occurrence. The predictive power of a 
prediction market, then, relies on appropriate pricing of its market contracts. 
As market pricing is determined by the free exchange of contracts, the 
forecasting ability depends on the rationality of market participants to 
aggregate information, observe market prices, and trade accordingly.
For many contracts, the question of whether the contract is priced accurately 
is a subjective one. The pricing of standalone market contracts such as “Will the 
American Health Care Act pass?” is a subject of debate by informed traders. For 
market contracts that are interdependent, however, it is possible to objectively 
determine that the set of related contracts as a whole is mispriced. Consider the set 
of prediction market contracts concerning the winner of the 2016 U.S. presidential 
election; political prediction markets hosted individual contracts representing 
every officially-announced candidate and many other plausible candidates. As 
there is only one election winner, the sum of all individual contract prices should 





— Double auction 
(open or closed order 
book) 
Double Auction / 
Closed Order Book 
(only best bid/ask 
shown)
Double Auction / Open 
Order Book
Trading hours Internet-based / 24–7 Internet-based / 24–7
Long and/or short 
trading
Long; Short selling 
equivalent via bundles
Long and Short




Limit and Market 
(trader can buy/sell at 
existing bid/ask price, 
or place bid/ask that 
fulfilled when 
matched)
Limit and Market 
(trader can buy/sell at 
existing bid/ask price, 
or place bid/ask that 
fulfilled when matched)
Position limits and 
price limits
$500 across all 
contracts in account.
Each contract is limited 
to only 5,000 unique 
traders at one time, 
with each trading 
position limited to $850 
in value.




10% profit fees; 5% 
withdrawal fees
Table 2. (continued)
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not exceed the payout amount. The markets hosted by IEM often include a “rest of 
field” contract that is satisfied if none of the individual-candidate contracts are. In 
this case, then, the total price should equal the payout amount exactly, with any 
gains by one candidate’s contract coming directly at the expense of all other 
candidates’ contracts. However, in practice, prices may not be so ideally 
coordinated, and could present opportunities for arbitrage.
For example, in Table 3, hypothetical scenarios of linked markets are 
evaluated for such arbitrage opportunities. These cases represent examples of 
successful buy-all-contracts and sell-all-contracts arbitrage, as well as a case 
in which there is no profitable arbitrage trade possible.
An actual observed example of a mispriced PredictIt market with profitable 
arbitrage is presented in Table 4. In this case, the nominal mispricing (arbitrage 
profit before fees) to sell one share of each contract is Πnom = βi −p =21¢i
N
∑ ; 
with PredictIt’s profit fee, the arbitrage profit is reduced to 9.1¢. By trading the 
optimal share distribution shown in the right column of Table 4, a profit of 
13.0¢ can be realized. If the bid volume allows the trader to trade up to the 
$850 contract limit (limited by the cheapest contract, Biden) at these prices, 
then a profit of approximately $113 can be earned.
In light of such potential mispricings on PredictIt, an observant trader will 
note that the contract pricing amounts to a riskless profit, an arbitrage 
Table 3. Hypothetical examples of linked markets with payout p = $1 that are 
evaluated for arbitrage opportunities. (Top-left) In this market, one could buy 
every contract at the ask price and receive the payout, earning $1 − $0.95 = $0.05 
per share before fees. (Top-right) In this market, one could sell every contract at 
the bid price and pay the payout, earning $1.06 − $1 = $0.06 per share before fees. 
(Bottom) In this market, there is no arbitrage opportunity. Please note 1¢ 
(cent) = $0.01.
Contract Bid (¢) Ask (¢)
Candidate 1 50 52
Candidate 2 25 26
Candidate 3 10 11
Candidate 4 5 6
Sum 90 95
Contract Bid (¢) Ask (¢)
Candidate 1 57 58
Candidate 2 28 29
Candidate 3 12 13
Candidate 4 9 10
Sum 106 110
Contract Bid (¢) Ask (¢)
Candidate 1 57 58
Candidate 2 26 27
Candidate 3 10 11
Candidate 4 5 6
Sum 98 102
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opportunity. If one can buy contracts representing all possibilities for a total 
price less than the payout, then an arbitrageur can capture that difference by 
buying shares in every contract (see example in Table 3, top-left). In practice, 
this strategy is riskless, unless there remains a possibility that none of the 
candidates win. If there exists an “all-other” contract as in IEM markets, then 
risk can be eliminated. Neglecting the chance of an outsider win but accounting 
for fees, the profit can be calculated as:
Πbuy −all =payout−profitfee−withdrawalfee−purchasecost 
−transactionfee−depositfee
















−  fd  (2.1)












−  fd  (2.2)
where αi’s are the ask prices, αwc is the ask price of the winning contract, n is 
the number of shares purchased per contract, and N is the number of unique 
contracts available (or number of candidates). Eq. (2.1) represents the profit 
realized when a certain candidate wins, whereas Eq. (2.2) represents the 
minimum certain profit, which may increase depending on the winner. The 
payout amount p and fee amounts fd, fp, ft, fw for several political prediction 
markets are given in Table 5.
Table 4. PredictIt contract bid/ask prices for linked market for the winner of the 
2016 U.S. presidential election. Prices were observed on April 6, 2016 at 5:40pm 
EDT. The optimal share distribution is presented in the right-most column.
Contract Bid (¢) Ask (¢) ni
Clinton 60 61 1.062
Trump 19 20 1.017
Cruz 14 15 1.012
Sanders 13 14 1.011
Kasich 6 7 1.004
Ryan 4 5 1.002
Romney 3 4 1.001
Biden 2 3 1
Sum 121 129
THE JOURNAL OF PREDICTION MARKETS
2020 14 1
80






∑α i ,  IEM
$1−  f p  $1−αmin( ) 1− fw( )−  
i
N










Similarly, if one can sell contracts for a total price greater than the payout, 
then an arbitrageur can capture that difference as profit (see example in Table 3, 
top-right). This opportunity is inherently riskless, and in the exceptional case 
that none of the listed candidates win, the profit is significant.
The sell-all arbitrage profit can be calculated as:
Πsell−all=revenue−profitfee−withdrawalfee−payout−transactionfee− 
















































=n 1− fw( ) 1− f p( )
i
N

















−  fd  (2.4)
Πsell−all ≥n  1− fw( ) 1− f p( )
i
N


















Table 5. Prediction Market Payouts, Fees, and Limits for IEM and PredictIt, with 
Nadex and Predictious given for comparison (University of Iowa, 2016; Victoria 
University of Wellington, 2015a; Nadex, 2017; Pixode, 2017). Note that the contract 
limit for IEM includes investment in all contracts (account limit); the Nadex trading 
fee is $1 per share for the first 50 shares only and $1 per share at settlement if 
in-the-money; the trading fee for Predictious is a function of the contract price, 
with the highest amount presented. Note “mBTC” refers to 1/1000 of a bitcoin.
Type IEM PredictIt Nadex Predictious
p Payout $1 $1 $100 10mBTC
fd Deposit Fee $5 0 0 0
fp Profit Fee 0 10% 0 0
ft Trading Fee 0 0 $2 0.1mBTC
fw Withdrawal Fee 0 5% 0 0
cL Contract Limit $500 $850 2500+ none
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where βi’s are the bid prices and βwc is the bid price of the winning contract. As 
with the buy-all case, Eq. (2.4) represents the profit realized when a certain 
candidate wins, whereas Eq. (2.5) represents the minimum certain profit, 
which may increase depending on the winner. Per share traded, this reduces to 




∑βi −$1,  IEM
1− f p( )
i
N


















For the purpose of this analysis, arbitrageurs are assumed to be price-
takers, buying at the prevailing ask price and selling at the bid price. Likewise, 
deposit and withdrawal fees have also been neglected in Eq. (2.6) and in 
subsequent analysis (or assumed to be zero for simplicity) because these fees 
do not represent marginal costs of engaging in arbitrage. Deposit fees may play 
a role in the entry decision for new traders wishing to enter the market simply 
to exploit arbitrage opportunities. However, these fees are negligible for 
analyzing arbitrage profits for existing traders who have presumably already 
incurred this cost. Further, every trader pays withdrawal fees when taking 
their money out of the website, regardless of whether they engaged in any trade 
at all and regardless of whether it was an arbitrage trade or not. 
The IEM and PredictIt frequently host interdependent markets in a linked 
format. On IEM, traders can purchase individual contracts and sell back a 
complete bundle to execute a buy-all arbitrage trade, or buy the bundle and sell 
the constituents to execute a sell-all arbitrage trade. On PredictIt, a risk calculation 
is performed automatically upon trading, returning traders any money invested 
greater than the maximum possible loss. These mechanisms effectively allow 
traders to capture arbitrage profits without waiting until the market settlement, 
enabling repeated arbitrage trades until the opportunity disappears or the 
contract limit is reached. As the trader can continue to reuse the initial investment, 
deposit and withdrawal fees need only be assessed at the end of a series of trades, 
not on each individual one. Thus, while deposit and withdrawal fees may factor 
into individuals’ decisions to enter into a market (and potentially into their choice 
regarding which market to enter), these are not considered marginal costs for 
exploiting arbitrage opportunities. Also note that taxes have not been considered 
in this analysis as tax rates and policies may depend on the trader’s domicile and 
nationality. In the United States, for example, prediction market winnings may 
be classified as miscellaneous or gambling income and subject to income taxation 
(Victoria University of Wellington, 2015a).
In a market without profit fees (fp = 0), selling one share of each contract 
would result in an outcome-independent payoff, excluding the case in which 
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the winning candidate is not represented by a contract. However, if fees are 
taken as a percentage of profit on each contract, as in PredictIt markets, then 
the outcome-independent result is generally not realized by trading a uniform 
number of shares. Instead, the profit from the worst-case profit (2.6) is 
immediately distributed to the trader, with the possibility of additional profit at 
market expiration. To the closest integer values, an astute trader can minimize 
this effect by varying the number of shares traded for each contract nj, 
depending on their bid price βj and the profit fee fp (2.7). This can be derived by 












β −njβ j( )f p
−nip + niβifp=−njp + njβjfp
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p −βi f p( )
p −β j f p( )
Where !n  is the vector representing the number of shares traded and 
!
β   is the 
vector representing the bid prices, respectively, of all contracts in the linked 






















An instant refund of arbitrage profits allows the trader to leverage a small 
amount of capital to establish a large arbitrage position up to the contract limits 
imposed by the market organizer. If the market is sufficiently large that the 
trader does not influence the price, the profit can then be calculated as Πopt * nmax 
where nmax =cL / p −min
!
β( )( )  refers to the maximum allowable number of 
shares to reach the contract limit. IEM arbitrageurs are far less restricted by 
the contract limit, as the arbitrage trading technique does not require contract 
retention; in contrast, PredictIt traders retain the contracts until the position is 
closed or settled.
Without fees ({fd, fp, ft, fw} = 0), it remains profitable to pursue arbitrage 
trades as long as the price sum does not equal the payout. With fees included, 
such trading is profitable only if the arbitrage proceeds exceed the fees. For 
PredictIt traders employing the sell-all strategy and varying the number of 
ARBITRAGE IN POLITICAL PREDICTION MARKETS
83
shares by Eq. (2.7), the realization of arbitrage profits when Πopt > 0 is limited 
only by the trader’s ability to approximate the optimal share counts by integers 
and by the contract limit. For less-sophisticated PredictIt ‘sell-all’ arbitrageurs 
that sell equal numbers of all contracts, arbitrage trading only remains 














∑ . In PredictIt markets, the minimum 
bid price is often the minimum trading price: 1¢. In this case, the minimum 
sum of bid prices to allow arbitrage trading is $1.11. For bid price sums less 
than this amount and a minimum bid price of 1¢, profitable arbitrage trading 
proves difficult, despite the nominal mispricing.
Note that because the PredictIt profit fee in sell-all arbitrage is assessed on each 
component contract, in the steady state, βii
N













However, consider an alternative formulation in which profit fee for sell-all arbitrage 
is assessed on the entire arbitrage transaction (i.e. set of contracts rather than each 
individual contract): n βi −npi
N
∑ , instead of βi −nβwci
N
∑ . In this case,
Πsell−all
* =n 1− fw( ) 1− f p( )
i
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−  fd  (2.9)
Assuming constant n and {fd, ft, fw} = 0,
Πsell−all

















Thus, as can be seen from Eq. (2.10), βii
N
∑  tends towards p in the steady 
state, eliminating mispricing. This is one solution that PredictIt could implement 
in order to prevent chronic mispricing resulting from sell-all arbitrage.
4 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
4.1 MISPRICINGS IN PREDICTIT VS. IEM – U.S. 2016 ELECTION
In this section, we probe the existence of mispricings in the PredictIt and IEM 
markets for the 2016 U.S. elections, and discuss key factors of mispricings, 
such as profit fees and contract limits. Specifically, we use market data from 
the general presidential election in PredictIt and the Democratic and Republican 
THE JOURNAL OF PREDICTION MARKETS
2020 14 1
84
nomination primary elections from both PredictIt and IEM. Both markets 
provide daily trade data including opening trade price, closing trade price, 
high trade price, low trade price, and trade volume.2 Arbitrage opportunities 
and market mispricings are evaluated using the sell-all arbitrage from the 
framework above (2.6) without consideration of withdrawal fees and using the 
close price as the primary estimate of the bid price. The optimal share trading 
strategy (2.8) was not used, given the lack of knowledge of the leading bid 
contract sizes at every point in time.
We find that significant arbitrage opportunities existed in the 2016 
presidential election markets hosted by PredictIt. The prices of individual 
contracts and the sum of the prices are presented for PredictIt’s general election, 
Democratic nomination, and Republican nomination markets in Figure 1 (left), 
with the sell-all arbitrage profit plotted in Figure 1 (right). For nearly the entire 
duration of the markets, the sum of the prices significantly exceeded the payout 
value of $1, indicating that the markets were consistently mispriced.
A significant change appears in the market behavior around October 2015. 
At this time, the price sum falls precipitously in all three markets, consequently 
reducing arbitrage profits. After this point, arbitrage profits continue to exist 
in the general election and Republican nomination markets at a lesser profit 
value, and arbitrage profit in the Democratic nomination market ceases. This 
steep drop corresponds to PredictIt’s introduction of linked markets (Victoria 
University of Wellington, 2015b), which is discussed in Sec. 4.2.
In contrast to the findings from PredictIt, we find that the IEM Democratic 
and Republican nomination markets did not experience the same persistent 
mispricings that were endemic to equivalent markets in PredictIt. Consider the 
Republican primary markets from PredictIt and IEM depicted in Figure 1 
(bottom-left) and Figure 2 (right), respectively. The comparable IEM contract 
set shows some evidence of mispricing as the sum of the contract prices is 
often above or below the payout amount.3 However, such IEM mispricings 
were short-lived, with the total price not deviating from the payout amount for 
more than a several days at a time. In contrast, the difference between the 
PredictIt price sum and the payout was much greater in magnitude and persisted 
through nearly the entire primary election season. Similar behavior can be 
2 We use closing trade prices rather than bid/ask prices, as bid/ask prices were not 
available: bid = max(0, min(close,high – increment)) where the price increment is 1¢ 
for PredictIt and 0.1¢ for IEM. This estimate is conservative (predicts less mispricing 
& arbitrage profit) than leading bid estimates from literature (Corwin and Schultz, 
2012; Abdi and Ranaldo, 2017). See Appendix for more details on these estimation 
methods.
3 Further, the “mispricing” we observe in the IEM may be considered virtually 
nonexistent if bid/ask price data were available. However, we do not expect the use of 
trade prices, rather than bid/ask prices, to explain away large and persistent mispricings 
observed in PredictIt.
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Figure 1. Prices of U.S. presidential market contracts in three PredictIt markets 
are given at left: (top) general election, (middle) Democratic nomination, (bottom) 
Republican nomination. The contract prices of each candidate are presented in 
greyscale, while the total price is shown in black. At right, the arbitrage profit is 
given, calculated by Eq. (2.6).
observed for the Democratic primary and general election markets as well (see 
Figure 1 (middle-left) and Figure 2 (left)). Relative to the PredictIt markets, the 
IEM markets’ price sum deviated little from the payout value of $1 and seldom 
held greater or less than $1 for more than a few days at a time. Consequently, 
profitable arbitrage trading in the IEM markets was limited and short-lived.




To highlight the impact of profit fees on arbitrage, we present the arbitrage 
profits for the two PredictIt markets from 2016 at the real value of fp = 10% 
against a hypothetical no-fee market (fp = 0) in Figure 3. At the real fp profit fee 
rate, the arbitrage profit was approximately zero after December 2015, creating 
no profit incentive for traders to erode the market mispricing. Illustrating the 
effect of PredictIt’s 10% profit fee, the markets remained at the mispriced 
equilibrium, distinct from the efficient no-fee market equilibrium wherein the 
price sum equals the payout.
The observations given above provide insight into the market design of 
American political prediction markets and their ability to effectively forecast 
election outcomes. Market data indicates that PredictIt markets for the 2016 
presidential elections were consistently mispriced over the life of the markets, 
with the price sum exceeding the payout value. This was, in part, due to the 
high investment and distant payout required to realize arbitrage profits, but 
the mispricing remained even after PredictIt introduced linked-contract 
pricing in October 2015, as can be seen in Figure 3 (and will be discussed 
further in the next section). Analysis of arbitrage profitability suggests that 
PredictIt’s 10% profit fee significantly impacts the profit incentive to trade 
upon and reduce market mispricings, allowing the market to remain at a 
mispriced equilibrium (Figure 3). In contrast, such mispricings did not exist 
in IEM. Comparing the two markets, this difference is likely due to the IEM’s 
fee structure, which charges no fee on profits. Consequently, IEM traders can 
profitably trade the price sum down to the level of the payout, within the limits 
of bid/ask spreads.
Figure 2. Prices of U.S. presidential market contracts in two IEM markets are 
given: (left) Democratic nomination, (right) Republican nomination. The contract 
prices of each candidate are presented in greyscale, while the total price is shown 
in black.
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4.1.2 CONTRACT LIMITS
An additional difference between PredictIt and IEM that might compound with 
the effects of the profit fees described above are contract limits. As 
aforementioned, arbitrage-seeking traders on IEM are less impacted by the 
$500 contract limit than PredictIt traders are. Completing a buy-all or sell-all 
arbitrage trade involves buying/selling individual contracts and selling/buying 
a complete bundle. Once the pair of trades is completed, no contracts need be 
retained, resetting the contract value total to zero. In contrast, PredictIt traders 
retain the contracts until the position is closed or settled, making the $850 limit 
a hard constraint.
Combined with the profit fees, the consequence of this implementation 
difference is that IEM traders can continually execute arbitrage trades 
whenever mispricings exist, whereas PredictIt traders can only profitably do so 
when (1) the mispricing is sufficiently large to overcome the profit fee and (2) 
they have not yet reached the contract limit. These combined limitations on 
PredictIt traders’ ability to erode down mispricings through arbitrage trade 
likely contributes to lasting existence of the mispricings.
4.1.3  TRADER INEXPERIENCE AND LIMITS ON THE 
NUMBER OF TRADERS
Other contributing factors to PredictIt’s enduring market mispricings may be 
trader experience and the limited number of traders per market. In contrast to 
IEM, PredictIt appeals to a broader audience by advertising online, has 
numerous markets, and can be instantly funded by credit card (rather than 
requiring a check or wire transfer). Thus, its trading population may be less 
experienced at identifying and executing arbitrage trades, consistent with 
Figure 3. Arbitrage profits in two PredictIt markets are given, calculated by 
Eq. (2.6) with the existing profit fee, fp = 10% and no profit fee, fp = 0: (left) 
Democratic nomination, (right) Republican nomination.
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findings by Tetlock (2004) and Oliven and Rietz (2004). Further, in the context 
of the limited number of traders per market (5,000 for PredictIt per CFTC), 
inexperienced traders may crowd out experienced, arbitrage-aware traders. 
Trader inexperience may also compound with contract limits imposed by the 
CFTC, as the experienced traders who identify arbitrage trades can only trade 
a limited volume to decrease them. Nonetheless, consequences of trader 
experience may ease with time, as traders gain knowledge and experience. 
Some traders have taken to educating others on arbitrage identification; this 
topic has become a recurring discussion on PredictIt’s online forums, has been 
published in books (Chougule, 2016), and has been developed as an open-
source browser plug-in (Raznikov, 2017).
4.2  MARGIN-LINKING, LIQUIDITY, AND MARKET 
DESCRIPTIVENESS
In this section, we discuss the impact of margin-linking, high trading volume, 
and market descriptiveness (the number of unique contracts with non-zero 
price) on arbitrage profits. These factors were chosen based on their relevance, 
data availability, and their goodness of fit.4 We first describe these variables 
and then test their influence on arbitrage using an ordinal least squares (OLS) 
regression on PredictIt’s 2016 election data.5
4.2.1 MARGIN-LINKING
In October 2015, PredictIt introduced “margin linking” or linked-contract 
pricing. Prior to linked contract-pricing, PredictIt’s trading system deducted 
funds from a trader’s account if a trader incurred a loss on a given contract, 
without taking into consideration multiple contracts purchased by the same 
trader that would reduce the total loss incurred by the trader (Schmitz and 
Rothschild, 2019). With linked-contract pricing, PredictIt started to take into 
account linked outcomes of multiple contracts purchased by any individual 
trader, and deducted only the maximum possible loss amount across all linked 
4 For example, the measure of market descriptiveness was considered between (1) 
number of unique contracts, (2) number of unique contracts with non-zero price, and 
(3) number of unique contracts with non-zero price and non-zero daily volume. Each 
of these alone was found to have a statistically significant relationship with the 
arbitrage profit, but option (2) was the most significant factor by T-statistic, adjusted 
R2, and F-statistic. When included as the measure of market descriptiveness in the full 
OLS analysis (Eq. 3.1), Option (2) maximized the adjusted R2 and F-statistic.
5 Specifically, we consider data from the following 2016 election markets: presidential 
general election (USPRES), winning political party (PARTY), Democratic primary 
nomination (DNOM), Republican primary nomination (RNOM), Democratic vice-
president candidate (DVP), Republican vice-president candidate (RVP), Secretary of 
State (SECSTATE) on 1/31/2018, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) on 2/28/2017.
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contracts. Such linked contract-pricing permits traders to leverage larger 
positions with less money invested, which in turn allows them to pursue arbitrage 
trading more aggressively. Restated, the instant payouts when arbitrage is 
realized allows traders to continue to trade from a small investment, whereas the 
prior scheme rewarded arbitrageurs only after the market ended, posing a far 
lesser return on investment.
We examine the impact of the October 2015 policy change that created 
linked-contract pricing on PredictIt. Firstly, it is observed that the PredictIt 
market mispricing persisted even after the October 2015 policy change that 
created linked-contract pricing. The magnitude of the mispricing fell 
significantly in the markets observed (Figure 1), but the price sum remained 
above the payout value for the remainder of the market term. Despite the 
continuing mispricing mentioned in Sec. 4.1., examination of the arbitrage 
profitability for the Democratic and Republican nomination markets reveals 
that arbitrage trades were generally not profitable after December 2015. The 
effect of margin linking observed here is similar to that observed by Schmitz 
and Rothschild (2019) using sum of mid-quote prices (average of the bid and 
ask prices) from the state of Iowa’s presidential primaries in 2016.
4.2.2 LIQUIDITY
Market illiquidity is considered to be a transaction cost for arbitrageurs whose 
trades contribute to achieving price efficiency. Alternatively, liquidity can also 
represent non-informational or noise trading, which could negatively impact 
prediction markets. Empirical evidence on the subject is mixed, supporting 
both negative and positive relationships between increased liquidity and price 
efficiencies (Tetlock, 2008). We thus examine the impact of greater liquidity, 
measured by trading volume, on arbitrage profits in PredictIt.
We observe that high trading volume did not preclude mispriced markets 
in PredictIt. In fact, markets exhibited the most severe pricing inconsistencies 
when trading volume was the highest. Correlation between high trading 
volume and market mispricing was especially apparent in PredictIt’s Secretary 
of Defense and Secretary of State markets, shown in Figure 4. In these markets, 
the total price exceeded the payout value specifically when the daily trading 
volume was highest.
4.2.3 MARKET DESCRIPTIVENESS
Another aspect of market design that differs between IEM and PredictIt is 
market descriptiveness, measured by the number of uniquely traded contracts 
with non-zero price. For example, PredictIt hosted markets for ten candidates 
for the Democratic nomination and 21 candidates for the Republican nomination 
which exhibited significant mispricing; in contrast, IEM hosted markets for 
two and four candidates, respectively, each with an additional rest-of-field 
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market and exhibited very little mispricing. There may exist a tradeoff 
between market descriptiveness – i.e. valuing a broad field of candidates – and 
efficient market pricing. We examine the impact of the number of uniquely 
traded contracts on arbitrage profits below.
4.2.4 ASSOCIATION WITH ARBITRAGE
In order to more precisely discern the relationship between margin-linked 
markets, trading volume, and the number of non-zero-priced contracts on 
arbitrage profits, we conduct an OLS (3.1) on the market data to predict sell-all 
arbitrage profit 
⌢
Π=Πtrue( )  from the following PredictIt markets: 2016 general 
election winner, Democratic presidential nomination, Democratic vice-
presidential nomination, Republican presidential nomination, Republican vice-
presidential nomination, winning presidential party, Secretary of Defense on 
2/26/2017, and Secretary of State on 1/31/2017.
⌢
Π=c0+c1log 10V +c2Nac +c3L   (3.1)
Explanatory variables are the base-10 logarithm of daily trading volume 
(log10V), the number of candidates represented with non-zero-priced contracts 
(Nac), and a binary variable L representing whether the date is before (L = 0) or 
after (L = 1) October 1, 2015, the date that PredictIt transitioned to linked-
contract pricing. The results of the ordinary least squares regression are 
presented in Table 6.
First note that coefficient c3 indicates that the arbitrage profit fell 
significantly, by 54.7¢ per share, after the transition to linked markets in 
October 2015.
Next, the regression also shows that market volume and the number of 
traded contracts in the market are positively related with arbitrage profit. Each 
additional candidate market added to the PredictIt market increased the price 
Figure 4. Total price and daily trading volume in the PredictIt markets for the 
U.S. Secretaries of Defense (left) and State (right).
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sum by an average of 3.672¢ for the markets observed. This effect may be in 
part due to the minimum contract price and price increment of 1¢ on PredictIt 
and 0.1¢ on IEM; at low prices, the representation error between the true 
probability and allowable prices may be significant when summed over all 
candidates. Alternatively, every additional candidate contract in the market 
increases the effort required to execute arbitrage trades, possibly dissuading 
potential arbitrageurs.6
Finally, a key finding regarding PredictIt’s prediction market 
performance is that higher trading volume did not correlate with better-
priced markets, but in fact the opposite. This runs contrary to previous 
analyses that have shown that increased liquidity serves to reduce arbitrage 
profits in commercial futures and options markets (Roll et al., 2007; Deville 
and Riva, 2007). This finding is generally counter-intuitive as more popular 
markets are expected to better aggregate information since they allow 
arbitrageurs to rapidly trade on observed mispricings. Nevertheless, there 
are a few possible explanations for this result which deserve further analysis 
in future work. Increased liquidity in the form of increased trading volume 
could be representing non-informational or noise trading (Tetlock, 2008). 
There are studies that suggest increased number of inexperienced traders 
can increase price inefficiency in prediction markets (Tetlock, 2004; Brown 
et al., 2019; Schmitz and Rothschild, 2019). Another plausible explanation 
is contract limits. Such limits are imposed per trader on academic American 
prediction markets by the CFTC as they restrict the ability of traders to 
enact arbitrage trades to erode the mispricing. These limits pose the sole 
barrier that prevents a trader from continuously exploiting profitable 
6 Note that the tradeoff between market descriptiveness and efficient market pricing is 
particularly relevant in the absence of automated trading in the PredictIt market. If 
PredictIt allowed for automated trading like IEM does, trading bots could remove 
arbitrage opportunities instantaneously, regardless of the number of contracts.
Table 6. Ordinary least squares analysis of arbitrage profit in selected PredictIt 
markets
Variable c0 (cents) c1 (cents) c2 (cents) c3 (cents)
Coefficient –2.759 2.354* 3.672* –54.712*
(Std. Error) (1.521) (0.204) (0.065) (1.197)
T-statistic –1.814 11.551 56.142 –45.713
No. of observations = 3592
Adjusted R2 =0.692
F-statistic vs. constant model = 2690
*Statistically significant at p=0.05 level
THE JOURNAL OF PREDICTION MARKETS
2020 14 1
92
arbitrage opportunities. Contract limits, however, are not without value; 
limiting the influence of each trader reduces the need for market enforcement 
against manipulation and insider trading. If the market were sufficiently 
large to necessitate market enforcement, operation costs and fees might 
increase. Nevertheless, given that contract limits are imposed, improved 
market implementation may abate their negative consequences. The specific 
technique used to execute arbitrage trades on IEM markets is far less 
limited by contract limits than on PredictIt. This reveals that different 
market configurations can diminish the effect of contract limits on arbitrage 
trading.
4.3 MISPRICINGS IN PREDICTIT FOR THE U.S. 2020 ELECTION
Finally, we analyze the most recent data available on the Democratic 
nomination, Republican nomination, and presidential election markets for the 
2020 American presidential election from 10/5/2018 to 1/10/2020. As before, 
arbitrage opportunities and market mispricings are evaluated using the sell-all 
arbitrage from the framework above (2.6) without consideration of withdrawal 
fees and using the close price as the primary estimate of the bid price; the 
optimal share trading strategy (2.8) was not considered.
We find that popular markets on PredictIt have continued to be chronically 
mispriced in other election cycles. The Democratic nomination, Republican 
nomination, and presidential election markets for the 2020 American 
presidential election have consistently evinced bid price totals greater than the 
payout amount. An illustration is shown in Figure 5, which depicts the daily 
Figure 5. Prices of U.S. presidential market contracts in the 2020 PredictIt 
general election market is given at left. The contract prices of each candidate are 
presented in greyscale, while the total price is shown in black. At right, the 
arbitrage profit is given, calculated by Eq. (2.6).
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price history and arbitrage profit in PredictIt’s 2020 American presidential 
election market; the bid price sum is consistently greater than the payout 
amount, and profitable arbitrage opportunities appear to exist only in small 
magnitudes.
4.4  DURATION AND MAGNITUDE OF MISPRICINGS AND 
ARBITRAGE – U.S. 2016 AND 2020 ELECTIONS
Finally, we attempt to place in context the duration and magnitude of 
mispricings and arbitrage observed on PredictIt. Luckner and Weinhardt 
(2008), after ignoring extremely small arbitrage opportunities of presumably 
little interest to traders, reported 229 instances of arbitrage opportunities at 
1% of the portfolio value, which on average lasted 47 minutes and 7 instances 
arbitrage opportunities at 10% of the portfolio value, which on average 
lasted 11 minutes. Similarly, Rhode and Strumpf (2004), observed that large 
mispricings were short-lived, i.e. 8 to 10 days. In our analysis, arbitrage 
opportunities at 1% of value are uncountable as they are incredibly numerous 
and because they are too short-lived or dynamic. Arbitrage opportunities at 
10% of value or larger are indeed observed, especially prior to PredictIt’s 
introduction of margin-linking. Compared to prior findings, the mispricings 
and arbitrage profits we observe on PredictIt are large and persistent. For all 
the markets observed, Table 7 presents the duration of mispricings and of 
arbitrage profits for three levels: >5¢, >10¢, and >20¢. On PredictIt’s 2016 
election markets, mispricings greater than 20¢ lasted a total of 271 days in 
DNOM, 391 days in RNOM, and 433 days in USPRES, whereas mispricings 
in equivalent IEM’s markets lasted zero days. The trend for arbitrage profits 
is similar to the trend for mispricings. The case of largest arbitrage profit, 
170¢ per share (where cost per share = 100¢), is observed in February 2016 
in PredictIt’s RNOM market. Although the market depth of each position, 
i.e. number of shares on offer for each candidate/market, cannot be observed 
in the data, if we assume there are the maximum possible number of shares 
on offer (i.e. 850) for each candidate/market, the case of largest arbitrage 
profit amounts to $1445. Since that time, arbitrage profit observed is 
substantially lower. For the 2020 election, the largest arbitrage profit 
amounts to $85. Considering that the trade takes less than an hour to execute, 
the incentive to engage in arbitrage is not negligible. It is evident from Table 
7 that mispricings and arbitrage profits on PredictIt 2016 persisted for much 
longer than IEM 2016. Further, comparing PredictIt 2020 to PredictIt 2016, 
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5 CONCLUSIONS
Prediction markets are a promising mechanism for reducing election uncertainty. 
They are powerful tools for aggregating information and forecasting a wide 
variety of events, often outperforming polling data. These markets are effective 
predictors so long as their pricing remains efficient. 
In this paper, we highlight the need for updated research on price efficiency 
in political prediction markets, and in particular, on the weakest condition for 
efficiency, intra-market arbitrage. We provide a systematic comparison of the 
market designs of the two leading political prediction markets, the IEM and 
PredictIt. We hypothesized that market design features that set PredictIt apart 
from the IEM pose threats to its efficiency. Consistent with this hypothesis, we 
demonstrate that the most popular political prediction market that covered the 
2016 American presidential elections, PredictIt, exhibited persistent and 
significant pricing inconsistencies among candidate contracts, which likely 
detract from its predictive value. We also show that these mispricings persisted 
despite PredictIt’s introduction of linked-contract pricing in October 2015, 
which was expected to enhance traders’ positions and lead to more aggressive 
arbitrage and reduced mispricings. Further, we present evidence that market 
pricing inconsistencies of this type have recurred in PredictIt’s 2020 presidential 
election markets. We contrast PredictIt’s Democratic and Republican 
nomination markets with equivalent markets of the IEM, and show that the 
IEM did not experience such mispricings. 
Additionally, despite the expectation of fewer mispricings or arbitrage 
opportunities due to increased trade volume, we show the opposite to be true. 
Trade volume was positively correlated with arbitrage profits, further evidencing 
the unmitigated mispricings of PredictIt. We argue that the design structure of 
these markets is important in explaining the different outcomes. Profit fees, 
present in PredictIt and not in the IEM, reduce or eliminate the profit incentive 
for arbitrageurs to trade down market mispricings. The inclusion of an excessive 
number of unlikely candidates combined with a relatively coarse price increment 
may serve to unrealistically increase the price sum.
Additional research is needed for drawing causal links between key market 
design features, the regulatory framework of election markets, and the efficiency 
of PredictIt. Further examination of the CFTC-imposed limits and PredictIt’s 
recruitment strategies impacting the composition of traders, potential crowding 
out of experienced traders, along with the effects of trader composition on 
mispricing would be beneficial. Moreover, as there is insufficient prior evidence 
on large and persistent arbitrage, the performance of prediction markets under 
larger and more persistent arbitrage opportunities remains untested empirically. 
Our analysis cautions against taking the efficiency and predictive value of 
political prediction markets for granted by demonstrating the unprecedented 
extent of mispricings on PredictIt and highlighting aspects of market design 
likely to be contributors. The lessons learned from this analysis hold broadly for 
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other prediction markets and their market designs. Updated research on various 
aspects of efficiency of existing political markets are needed for ensuring market 
efficiency and predictive accuracy of existing and emerging prediction market 
platforms. Prediction market mechanisms may become increasingly important 
in the near future than previously anticipated owing to their potential for 
increasing or decreasing political misinformation, and thus there is a need to 
fine-tune our understanding of these market mechanisms.
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